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Income  Distributional Implications  of
Water Policy  Decisions
Richard E.  Just and David  Zilberman
Intrasectoral  issues  have received  relatively  little  attention  in analysis  of  the distributional
consequences  of  natural  resource  policy  decisions.  This  paper  presents  a  framework  for  such
analysis  and examines  how  intrasectoral  issues  can  change  intertemporally,  focusing  on  water
policy  in agriculture.  The results  show that income distribution  among farmers  depends on the
stochastic  structure  of  production and  marketing,  the size distribution  of  farms, credit market
imperfections,  and risk aversion in farmer  decisions.  It  is shown  that the introduction  of water
conservation  policies  may lead  to more  equitable  income distribution  among  farmers.
Analysis  of  the  distributional  implica-
tions of  natural resource  policy  decisions
presents  a multi-dimensional  problem.  In
agriculture three dimensions  of these im-
plications  are  of  special  concern:  inter-
temporal,  intersectoral,  and intrasectoral.
Methodologies  have been  well  developed
for examining intertemporal and intersec-
toral resource  issues [Fisher; Howe; Just et
al.; Dasgupta  and  Heal].  Interesting  ap-
plications  of these  methodologies  to agri-
cultural  resource  issues  are  contained  in
Dixon  et al.,  Regev  and  Hueth,  and  Zil-
berman.  However, intrasectoral issues have
received  relatively  little attention  in  for-
mal economic  analysis  even  though  such
issues have been a major  point of conten-
tion in much political controversy. For ex-
ample, many have argued  that the policy
of  cheap  water  in  California  benefitted
large  corporate  farms  at  the  expense  of
small family farms  [Hall  and LeVeen].
This paper introduces  a framework  for
explaining  the  intrasectoral  implications
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of  resource  policy  in an  economic  sector
with  characteristics  typical of agriculture
and examines how intrasectoral issues can
change  intertemporally.  Following  the
general historical  works of Schultz,  Coch-
rane,  and  Johnson,  the  framework  of  the
paper  recognizes  that  the  major  factors
characterizing  the  agricultural  sector  are
competitiveness,  uncertainty,  risk  aver-
sion,  imperfect  capital  markets,  techno-
logical  change  (sometimes  with  fixed
costs),  and heterogeneity  of farm  size.
Given the importance  of uncertainty  in
agriculture,  analysis  of the  equity  effects
of policies for the purposes of policy choice
must focus on  ex ante rather  than ex post
distributional implications because,  for the
most  part,  policies  are  determined  prior
to production  decisions. With uncertainty
and risk aversion, ex ante income  must be
discounted  for risk.  This  paper  evaluates
ex ante income distribution in terms of the
distribution  of  certainty  equivalent  in-
come among  farmers.
The  basis  for  existing  inequity  among
farmers  is  represented  by  a joint  micro-
parameter  distribution  of  productive  re-
sources, financial  resources, and  risk pref-
erences among farmers.  The equity effects
of selected resource policies are examined
by  investigating  the  distribution  of  the
certainty  equivalent of profits induced by
the microparameter  distribution and thenIncome Distribution and Water Policy
considering  the  changes  in  this  distribu-
tion which  may be  induced over  time by
various  policies.  The  dimensionality  and
complexity  of  this  distributional  analysis
problem  are  immense.  However,  several
simplifications  make the issue tractable for
analytical  purposes.  Farm  size,  credit
availability,  and  risk  preferences  are  all
assumed to be closely related to wealth, so
the  multi-dimensional  microparameter
distribution is simplified accordingly.  Also,
the  range  of  input  choices  made  by  the
farmer  is  simplified  considerably  by  fo-
cusing only  on a  few  broad choices  char-
acterized by fixed-proportions  production
functions.
The  results focus on  water policy  as an
example and show that the distribution  of
income among farmers can be made either
more  or less  equitable  in either  an  abso-
lute or a  relative  sense  depending  on the
stochastic  structure  of  production  and
marketing,  the  distribution  of  farm  size,
and the relative importance of credit mar-
ket  imperfections  and  risk  aversion  in
farmer  decisions.  Conditions  are  devel-
oped  in  which  common  policies  used  to
conserve  water  foster  distributional  equi-
ty;  other  conditions  are  developed  in
which  they  lead  to  less  equity.  It should
be  emphasized,  however,  that this  paper
is concerned only with distribution within
the agricultural  sector and  does  not  con-
cern  itself  with  distributional  issues  be-
tween  producers  and  consumers  (which
are investigated  at length  in  other  litera-
ture).  Finally,  the probable  long-term  ef-
fects of these policies on the farm  size dis-
tribution  and  the  cost  of future  resource
conservation  are considered.
The basic microeconomic foundation  of
the framework  is  developed  in  section  2,
and  the  microeconomic  behavior  of
farmers  with various characteristics  is in-
vestigated  in  section  3.  The effects  of  al-
ternative  policies are examined  in section
4. Short-term  equity effects are character-
ized  in  section  5.  The  implications  for
long-term  equity and  resource  conserva-
tion are discussed in section 6, and  section
7 contains the conclusions.
The Micromodel
The  microeconomic  model  of this  pa-
per follows Just and  Zilberman [1983] and
is outlined  as  follows.  Consider  initially a
single  farm  with  fixed  landholdings,  L,
valued  at price  PL  Suppose  the farm  can
allocate  its  land  in  any  proportion  be-
tween  two  Leontief technologies  (each of
which  may  itself represent  various  crop-
ping  mixtures).  Let  net  returns  per  acre
under  technology  i  be represented  by 7r 1,
i  =  1, 2,  with joint distribution.
[ir2-  [(m 2 )  \pa1r2  1  /
where m1 >  0, m2> 0,  and 0 <p <  1.
The two technologies are assumed to dif-
fer  in  their  degree  of  use  of  water.  For
example,  in  problems  of irrigation  versus
nonirrigation,  such as in the Western Great
Plains, technology  1 may be nonirrigation
while  technology  2  is  irrigation.  In  prob-
lems of selection of irrigation technology,
such  as  in  California,  technology  1  may
be irrigation  by flooding while technology
2 is irrigation by sprinkler  or drip.
To  accommodate  these  cases,  assume
that  technology  2  requires  an  additional
cost of w per acre (possibly negative)  over
technology  1 which translates into  an op-
portunity  cost  of w(l  +  r) where  r  is  the
(opportunity)  cost  of funds.  Also,  to  con-
sider  fixed  costs  of  irrigation  adoption,
suppose  a  fixed  investment  cost,  k,  must
be  incurred  with  annualized  cost  rk  be-
fore any land can be allocated to  technol-
ogy  2. This  cost may  involve  both capital
costs and  learning  costs.  Thus,  the invest-
ment decision  is a discrete choice, whereas
the land allocation  decision is a continuous
choice.  Both of these costs must be consid-
ered  in the context  of available  credit,  K,
in  making  the  investment  decision.  The
credit constraint  is
I(k  + wL2)  < K
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where  I  =  0  if  the  fixed  cost  is  not  in-
curred,  I  =  1 if the fixed  cost  is incurred,
and  L2 is the  amount of land allocated  to
the  second  technology.  We  assume  that
the credit constraint  is  not binding  if the
fixed  cost is not  incurred.
Now  assume  that  the  farmer  is  risk
averse  with  utility  function  U(.) defined
on wealth,  U'  >  0, U"  <  0.  Suppose  that
wealth,  W,  at  the  end  of  each  season  is
represented by the sum of the land value,
PLL,  and the net return from production.
Where L, is the amount of land allocated
to technology  1,  the decision  problem is




L 1 + L2 <  L
I(k + wL2)  K
L,  L  >2  0.
The results assume that risk aversion is not
so  great  or  returns  are  not  so  poor  as  to
prevent use of all available land.  Thus, the
land constraint  can be replaced  by a strict
equality.
To solve this decision problem, consider
first the choice of land allocation given the
investment  decision.  Assuming  full  utili-
zation,  the optimal  decision  with I  =  0 is
L,  =  L. Thus,  expected utility is
V,(L)  = EU[(pL  +  -r,)L].  (2)
Alternatively,  given the investment  is un-
dertaken  and  assuming  full  land  utiliza-
tion, the objective  of the decision problem
in  (1)  becomes
max  EU[(pL +  ir,)L + (r2 - r,)L 2 - rk]  (3)
L-aL2S20
subject to
k + wL2 - K.
In another context, Just and  Zilberman
(1984) show that the solution to (3) subject
to the constraints  is approximated  by
L2 =  max{0, min [Lc,  Lr,  L]}  (4)
where  L 1 L  - L2 and
L=  e  LR,  L=-
L  v=-  ,  L  w
R - palo  U"(W)
v  U'(W)
e = E(ir 2 - it,),  v  = Var(ir2 - Ir,)





and  (  is  the  coefficient  of  absolute  risk
aversion  at  expected  wealth.  Note  that
Lr  is  the  solution  to  the  expected  utility
maximization  problem  when L2 is  uncon-
strained,  and Lc  denotes land  allocated to
the  second  technology  when  the  credit
constraint  is binding.
To determine  the  investment  decision,
let
V,(L, L 2) =  EU[PLL  + 7r,(L  - L 2)
+  tr 2L2 - rk].
Assuming that the farmer is either myopic
or considers  future periods  to be  like the
current  one,  the  farmer  does  not  under-
take the investment  if  V1 >  V2 and does
undertake the investment  if  V2 >  V 1.
Alternative Farm Behavioral
Regimes
The  decision  rules  derived  above  sug-
gest that the farmers can be classified into
four regimes of behavior according to their
technology  and  land  allocation  choices.
The  first  is  the  specialized  noninvestors'
regime, and it includes farmers for whom
V 1 >  V2 and L2 =  0; the second regime  is
of  credit-constrained  investors,  and  it  in-
cludes  farmers  with  I  =  1 and  L2 =  Lc;
the  third  is  the  specialized  investors'  re-
gime,  and  it includes  the farms with  I  =
1 and  L2 =  L;  and the fourth  is  the risk-
diversifying  investors' regime, and it con-
sists of farms with I  =  1 and  L2 =  L;.
To examine policy issues quantitatively
in the context of the model, a distribution
of microparameters  among farmers  must
be specified. The  results here  focus on the
distribution  of risk preferences,  farm size,
and  credit  availability  with  farmers  as-
sumed  to  be  identical  in  other  respects.
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This is done  by considering  a distribution
of  farm  size  f(L)  and  then  specifying  a
relationship  between  farm  size  and  risk
preferences  and  credit.
Given this distribution of farm size, risk
preferences,  as reflected  by the coefficient
of  absolute  risk  aversion,  are  assumed  to
be  related  to  initial  wealth  or  farm  size
following the equation
0 =  0(Wo) =  O(L)
where initial wealth  is Wo =  pLL.  For no-
tational  purposes, let  the elasticity  of  risk
aversion  be  represented by
ao  L
- = r(L) =  - L
-aL 4
and assume 0  < 7 <  1. Absolute risk aver-
sion  is  assumed  to  be  constant  for  each
individual farmer;  however, r > 0 implies
that larger  farmers have less absolute  risk
aversion,  and  7  <  1  implies  that  larger
farmers  have  more  relative  risk  aversion
following  Arrow's  arguments.  For  sim-
plicity, the availability  of credit is also as-
sumed  to  be  related  to  initial  wealth  or,
equivalently,  to  farm  size  following  the
equation  K = aL. This relationship  is con-
sistent  with many  general credit-granting
practices.  Finally,  note that following the
assumption  of constant absolute  risk aver-
sion for individual  farmers, the  certainty
equivalent of income corresponding  to (2)
and  (9)  is
V,(L) =  (PL + m,)L - afL
2 (10)
V 2(L, L2) =  (PL + m,)L  + (m2-  m)L 2 - rk
- (a2L  + a2L2  + 2pa,aL,L 2).  (11)
Note  that  the  certainty  equivalents  in
(10) and (11) are measured in money terms
so that changes  in the distribution  of cer-
tainty equivalent are equivalent to changes
in the distribution of welfare effects  (com-
pensating  or equivalent  variation)  of pol-
icy  changes  [Just  et  al.].  The  certainty
equivalent  of individual  farms  with farm
size L  thus follows
V(L) =
V,(L) =  (PL  + m,)L - 22L
2
for  specialized  noninvestors
e  ea
V2(L,  L2)  =  PL  + m, +-aL
-- + rk
w




+ 2poaL2Le(L  - Lc)]
for  credit-constrained  investors
V,(L, L)  =  -rk  + (PL  + m 2)L
- -2TL2 2 2
for specialized  investors
V2(L,  L)  = -rk + (PL  + m,  + Re)L
e2  _
2¢v  2
(a  - R
2v)L2
for  risk-diversifying  investors
(12)
To  relate  farm  size  to  the  certainty
equivalent, it remains to see how the four
behavioral regimes are related to farm size.
Using  the  model  of  section  II,  the  rela-
tionship  of acreage allocation to farm size
can be determined as illustrated in Figure
1 following  (4).  Note that acreage  alloca-
tion  (to  technology  2)  is  physically  con-
strained to  lie on or between  lines L2 = L
(the  45-degree  line)  and  L2 =  0.  Second,
the acreage  allocation is constrained to lie
on  or  below  the  credit  limitation,  L2 =
La.  When these  limitations are  not  bind-
ing, the acreage allocation follows the risk-
diversification  line, L2 =  L2,  if fixed  costs
are zero. Finally, when fixed costs are pos-
itive, there are certain farm sizes for which
fixed  costs  cannot  be  adequately  spread
given  the risk and  available  credit; there-
fore,  the investment is not  worthwhile.
As shown in Figure 1, farm sizes can be
segmented  to  four  groups,  each  corre-
sponding  to  a  behavioral  regime.  Farms
smaller  than  La  are specialized  noninves-
tors, farms of  sizes between  La and  Lb are
credit-constrained  investors,  specialized
investors  belong  to the  segment  (Lb,  Lc),
and  risk-diversifying  investors  have  sizes
greater than  Lc.
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Figure  1.  Use  of a Technology  as a Function
of  Farm Size.
Note  that some  of  these  regimes  may
vanish and the ordering  of regimes  is dif-
ferent under different  conditions.1 To de-
termine  which  cases  can  occur  under  al-
ternative  sets of conditions,  note first that
dL~  L2 =  + (1 - )R
dL  L
L  1  as ?(m 2 - m)
¢  Oa 2 L(a 2 - paI) (13)
while
dL|  a  >1
d  =-=a  1  as  a= w.
dL  w  <
(14)
To  understand  these  conditions  further,
note from  (5) that 0  < Lr  < L  implies
kOalL(a2  - o1)  <  m2 - m,  <  0¢2L(a2
- pa).  (15)
Comparing  (13)  and  (15)  reveals  that
dLd/dL  <  1  if  m2 >  ml.  Next, note  that
-2 >  a, implies that the right-hand side of
the condition in (13) is positive; thus, either
m2  >  ml, in which case dLr/dL  <  1 from
above, or m2  - ml, in which case  (13)  also
1Here  irrigation  is assumed  to  be a risk-neutral  in-
put. Arguments  can be  made supporting  both risk-
increasing  and risk-reducing  effects.  The results  of
this paper hold,  however,  as long as  any risk effects
of irrigation  are secondary  to  the effects  on  mean
returns.  This  is likely  the case.
implies  dLd/dL  <  1.  Thus, dLU/dL  >  1
can  occur  only  if  m2 <  ml and  0-2  <  ao.
From  (13), a specific condition that causes
dLr/dL  >  1 is  n =  0  and  p  >  a2/1a.  By
analogy  (since  dL;/dL  =  1  - dLr/dL),
dLd/dL  >  0 if  -1 >  a2 or  ml  >  m2 while
dLd/dL  < 0 if r  =  0 and  p  >  a1/02.
These possibilities  give rise to the eight
cases listed in Table 1, each of which caus-
es  a  distinct  ordering  of  behavioral  re-
gimes by farm  size  as indicated.  The spe-
cific conditions  in Table 1 are sufficient  to
give  rise to each case although  not neces-
sary; that  is,  they do  not  exhaust  the  pa-
rameter space. Also, note that one or more
regimes  may  vanish  under  some  further
special  conditions  which  may  effectively
equate  some  cases.  For  example,  if  fixed
costs are zero when a >  w, credit can nev-
er be constraining-so, cases  1 and 2 pro-
duce  the  same  effective  ordering  of  ob-
servable  behavioral  regimes.
For purposes of discussion, the resulting
eight cases can be described intuitively by
the following:
Case  1.  Near  constant  absolute  risk
aversion  among  farms.  Very
high  correlation  of  profits
among  technologies  or  very
low-risk  investment  technolo-
gy. High credit.
Case  2.  Near  constant  absolute  risk
aversion  among  farms.  High
correlation  of  profits  among
technologies or low-risk  invest-
ment technology.  Low credit.
Case  3.  High-profit  investment  tech-
nology  or  high-risk  technolo-
gy (not both).  Very low credit.
Case  4.  Near  constant  absolute  risk
aversion  among  farms.  High
correlation  of  profits  among
technologies  or  low-risk  in-
vestment  technology.  Very
high credit.
Case  5.  High-profit  investment  tech-
nology  or  high-risk  invest-
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TABLE  2. The  Marginal  Effect  of Policies on
Farmers'  Welfare.
Special-  Credit-  Risk-
Policy  ized  con-  Special-  diver-
Param-  Nonin-  strained  ized  sifying
eter,  vestors,  Investors,  Investors,  Investors,
(y)  V(L)  V  (L,  (L)2  (L, L)  V 2(L, L)L
.............................................----------------------------------------  av/ay ---------------------------------------------
m2  0  L >O  L>0  > 0
m,  L>O  L>  >0  O  L  > 0
Case  6.  Absolute risk aversion  does not
vary among  farms.  High cor-
relation of profits among tech-
nologies  or  high-risk  invest-
ment technology. High credit.
Case 7.  Very  high-profit,  low-risk  in-
vestment  technology  or  very
high-risk,  low-profit  invest-
ment technology.  Low credit.
Case  8.  Near  constant  absolute  risk
aversion  among  farms.  High
correlation  of  profits  among
technolgoies  or  high-risk  in-
vestment  technology.  Low
credit.
Modeling  Effects  of Water
Resource  Policies
Based  on  the  model  of  section  3,  this
section  investigates  the effects  on farmer
behavior  of  several  alternative  water  re-
source  policies.  The  parameters  through
which  these  policies  are  reflected  in the
model  are ml and  m2.
Policy Question 1.  The effect of water
pricing on irrigation/nonirrigation  deci-
sions. This question is intended to consid-
er farmer behavior  in regions,  such as the
Western  Great  Plains,  where  the  impor-
tant effects  have  to  do  with  decisions  of
installing and using center-pivot irrigation
technology.  For  this  case,  suppose  that
technology  1  represents  production  by
traditional  dryland  methods  while  tech-
nology 2 represents production  using cen-
ter-pivot  irrigation equipment.  The  fixed
cost that facilitates technology 2 is the cost
of drilling wells and  installing center-piv-
ot  irrigation  equipment.  The  obvious  ef-
fect  of,  say,  raising the price  of water  by
policy legislation in the model is to reduce
m2,  the  net returns  per acre from  irriga-
tion farming.
Policy Question 2.  The effect of water
pricing on  adoption of  water-saving
technologies. This question is intended to
consider farmer behavior in regions of the
southwest where all crops are irrigated but
farmers  can  switch  from  conventional
gravity methods  to  sprinkler  or drip irri-
gation. For this case, let technology  1 rep-
resent  the  conventional  method  while
technology  2  represents  a  water-saving
technology.  The  fixed  cost  of  facilitating
the  water-saving  technology  consists
mainly  of  learning  costs  and  investment
in  pressure  pumps  and  pipes  or  tubes  to
increase  water pressure. The effect of rais-
ing water  price  is,  thus, to  lower both ml
and  m2;  but m,  is lowered  more than  m2
because  it uses  water more intensely.
Table  3. The  Marginal  Effects of Policies on  Absolute Income Distribution Within Regimes.
Policy  Specialized  Credit-constrained  Specialized  Risk-diversifying
Parameter  Noninvestors  Investors  Investors  Investors
(y)  V_(L)  V2(L  )  Lc)  V2(L, L)  V2(Ll L;)
..................................-------------------..  ... ----------------------------------------  d2V/L ay -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
m2  o  a>0  1  dL2  >  O  if m2 <  m, or a1  >  ' 2 m~~2  - 0  dL  <  ifm 2 >m 1;=0;p>p
a> Oif a < w  dLf>0  if  2 >  m or2 > (
1 w  >Oifa>w  dL  < 0if m2  < m;  0;  >  2
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Table  4.  The  Marginal  Effects of Policies on Relative  Income  Distribution Within Regimes.
Policy  Specialized  Credit-constrained  Specialized  Risk-diversifying
Parameter  Noninvestors  Investors  Investors  Investors
(Y)  VV(L)  V2(L1 L,)  V2(LV  L)  V2(Lr  L, )
-----------------.--.  -------  ..........  2(V/L)/aL  y ----------------------------------------...  ..
M2  0  0>  (  - 1)eJ>  0 if m 2 < m
wL
2 kvL
2 <  O if m 2 >  m,




<  O if m2  <  m
With this characterization,  both  of the
above policies can be represented in terms
of effects  on  ml  and  ml.  Table  2  derives
the  marginal  effects  of each  of these  pa-
rameters  on  the  expected  utilities  of
farmers  in each  behavioral  regime  using
equation  (12)  where  y  =  mI  or  m2. Note
that some  of  these  results are  derived  by
duality.
Intrasectoral Equity Effects  of
Water Resource  Policies
To  investigate  analytically  the  equity
effects  of water  policies, several  concepts
of qualitative  change in  income distribu-
tion are convenient.  This paper  uses four
qualitative  concepts  of  distributional  ef-
fects:  a spread  in  absolute  income  distri-
bution,  a  contraction  in absolute  income
distribution,  a  spread  in  relative  income
distribution,  and a contraction  in relative
income distribution.
A  policy  is  said  to  spread  the absolute
income distribution of farmers if, for every
pair  of  farmers,  the  difference  in  their
certainty equivalent is no smaller after the
change  than before  and  the difference  is
larger for at least one pair.  A policy is said
to  contract  absolute  income  distribution
if,  for  every  pair  of  farmers,  the  differ-
ence  in  certainty  equivalent  is  no  larger
and is smaller for at least one pair.  To see
whether  policy effects  are larger or small-
er for  more  well-off  individuals,  Table  3
derives  02V/(dOLy)  where  y  represents
some  policy instrument.  Absolute income
distribution  spreads  (contracts)  if  a2V/
(aLay)  > (<) 0 over  all farm  sizes.
To consider equity effects of policies on
relative  income  distribution,  certainty
equivalent  is  deflated  by farm  size.  Farm
size  is  a common  measure  of scale of op-
eration.  Most  policies can  be expected  to
have a larger  absolute  impact  on income
of larger farms.  However, if the increases
in income on larger  farms are larger even
relative to  scale of operation,  a rather se-
vere spread in income distribution results.
Such effects are of acute political concern
[Tweeten]  as they suggest  that the associ-
ated  policies  "help  the  rich  get  richer."
Thus,  to examine  further  the  equity  ef-
fects  of policies,  the  benchmark  of  farm
size  is introduced  to determine the degree
to  which income distribution is spread.  A
policy  is said to  spread  (contract) the rel-
ative income distribution if, for every pair
of farmers, the difference  in their ratio of
certainty  equivalent  to  farm  size  is  no
smaller  (larger)  after the change than be-
fore and the difference  is  larger  (smaller)
for at least  one pair.  To see  how changes
in  policy  affect  the  distribution  of  V/L,
first note that
a(V/L)  dV  1
dy  dy  L (16)
which  can  be  obtained  by  dividing  the
entries of Table 2 by L. The  slope of  (16)
with respect to farm size  is derived in Ta-
ble  4 using the identity
d
2(V/L)  d 2V  1  aV  1
OdLy  OL dy L  Oy  L2
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Relative income distribution spreads  (con-
tracts)  if this  derivative  is  positive  (nega-
tive) over  all farm  sizes.
To demonstrate  the implications of the
results in Tables  3 and 4,  consider the eq-
uity effects of a policy that increases  water
price on farms in an area that is switching
to irrigation  technology  (the effects  of re-
ducing  m2). Following the first row of Ta-
ble  3,  absolute  income  distribution  is  un-
affected among noninvestors  because they
do not buy water.  Absolute income  distri-
bution  contracts  among  credit-con-
strained  investors  because  larger  farms,
which have  more credit,  use more irriga-
tion technology  and  buy more  water.  In-
come  distribution  contracts  among  spe-
cialized investors because larger farms that
use  all  of  their  land  with  irrigation  buy
more  water.  Among  risk-diversifying
investors,  absolute  income  distribution
contracts if the irrigation technology is less
risky  than  the  nonirrigation  technology
(a, >  a2).  However,  it  spreads  if  absolute
risk  aversion  is  constant  among  farms  (7r
=  0),  the  correlation  of  profits  between
irrigation  and  nonirrigation  technologies
is high  (p  >  pi),  and the  irrigation  tech-
nology  is  riskier  than  the  nonirrigation
technology  (a2  > a1, which is necessary  for
p > Pi) assuming the irrigation technology
produces  more short-run  expected  profits
per  acre  (m2  >  mi).  The conditions  that
cause  absolute income distribution to con-
tract  (spread)  among  risk-diversifying
investors  are the same  as those that cause
land allocated to irrigation to increase  (de-
crease)  with farm  size.  Constant absolute
risk  aversion causes  absolutely  less land to
be  allocated  to  irrigation  on  larger  farms
if irrigation  is  more  risky  and the  corre-
lation  is too high to allow effective  diver-
sification  because  larger farms have more
absolute risk and, thus, must give up more
at the margin to  avoid risk.
Next consider the effects on relative in-
come distribution within  each  behavioral
regime of  a  water price  increase  in  a  re-
gion that  is  partially  irrigated.  Following
the  first  row  of Table  4,  relative  income
distribution  is  unaffected  among  non-
investors  again  because  they  do  not  pur-
chase water.  Relative  income distribution
contracts among  credit-constrained  inves-
tors if the fixed cost is positive since larger
farms  can better spread  fixed  costs.  Rela-
tive  income  distribution  is  unaffected
among  specialized  investors  because  total
water  use  is  proportional  to  farm  size.
Whether  relative  income  distribution
spreads  or  contracts  among  risk-diversi-
fying  investors  depends  on whether  land
allocated  to  irrigation  increases  or  de-
creases  relative  to  farm  size.  If the  irri-
gation technology produces more (less) ex-
pected  short-run  profits per acre,  relative
income  distribution  spreads  (contracts)
among risk-diversifying  farms.
Following  this  approach,  one  can  find
the  qualitative  effects  of  each  policy  of
this paper on  the short-run  distribution  of
income  with  behavioral  regimes.  Having
determined these qualitative effects, it re-
mains to investigate the effects  on the en-
tire  income  distribution.  To  do  this,  one
must  consider  how  farms  are  distributed
among behavioral regimes.  This is done in
Table  5 for each  policy question  in  a  va-
riety of special  cases.  To  understand how
Table  5 is  derived,  note  that any  farmer
at the margin between two behavioral  re-
gimes  would  have  the  same  certainty
equivalent wealth in either regime.  Thus,
income distribution over  two or more be-
havioral  regimes  that  are  consecutively
ordered  following  Table  1  will  spread
(contract)  if the  same  is  so  for  every  in-
dividual behavioral  regime.  On the other
hand,  if there  is  any  intervening  behav-
ioral regime affected  in the opposite qual-
itative Table 5 direction, the overall effect
is  ambiguous  (even  though  no  farms  fall
within  the  behavioral  regime)  unless  no
farm  size  (even hypothetical)  falls  within
the regime.
For example, following the results above
for  the  case  of  raising  water  price  in  a
partially irrigated region, absolute income
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distribution  contracts  if  the  irrigation
technology  is  less  risky  (Table 5,  row  lb)
while  both  the  absolute  and  relative  in-
come  distributions  contract  if  irrigation
yields  less  short-run  expected  profit  per
acre  (Table  5,  Case  Id)  since  the  same
qualitative  effect  occurs  in  every  behav-
ioral  regime.  The  latter  case  is  not  plau-
sible  unless farmers  have overinvested  in
irrigation, say,  owing to poor price expec-
tations; but the former  case  is quite plau-
sible.
On  the  other  hand,  if  credit  is  suffi-
ciently abundant so that no farm size leads
to credit-constrained  investment,  relative
income  distribution  spreads  if  irrigation
produces  more  short-run  expected  profit
per  acre  (Table  5,  row  If).  Furthermore,
both the relative and absolute income  dis-
tributions spread if irrigation leads to more
short-run  expected  profits  and  more  risk,
absolute  risk  aversion  is  constant  over
farms, correlation  of profits between tech-
nologies  is  high, and  either  risk  and  risk
aversion  are so high that credit would not
be limiting and  no farm would  specialize
in  irrigation  for  any  farm  size  or  (since
these conditions  imply  either  Case  6 or 8
of Table  1), no existing farm size is as small
as or smaller than farm  sizes that fall into
the  specialized  or  credit-constrained
investor regimes (Table 5, row le). In spite
of the many qualifications of this result, it
seems  quite  plausible.  Finally,  if  risk  or
risk  aversion  is  low  enough  so  that  risk
diversification  does  not  play  a  role  or  if
conditions  for Case  5 or 7 in Table  1 hold
and no farms are large enough to fall into
the  risk-diversification  regime,  absolute
income  distribution  contracts  if  at  least
some farms are investors (Table 5, row la)
and relative  income distribution  also con-
tracts if at  least  some  farms  are investors
constrained by credit  (Table 5,  row Ic).
Following  this approach,  the results for
cases too numerous to discuss here are ap-
parent.2 Because  of the complexity of these
2 Some simple  facts that should  be borne  in mind  in
many  cases,  the  remainder  of this  paper
considers  only  a  few  of  the  results  that
seem most likely in the absence of empir-
ical evidence tailored to the necessary dis-
tinction  of  cases  in  Tables  1  and  5.  For
this purpose,  assume  under  Policy  Ques-
tion 1 that irrigation leads to higher short-
run  expected  profits  per  acre  than  does
nonirrigation  because  of  the  need  to  re-
cover  fixed  costs.  Assume,  also,  that very
small  farms  cannot  find  sufficient  credit
to  invest  because  of  inability  to  spread
fixed  costs  but  that credit  becomes  suffi-
cient  to  allow  specialized  investment  at
some  farm  size;  thus,  m2 >  ml  and  a  >
w.  These  assumptions  suggest  that  farms
are distributed  among behavioral regimes
according  to Case 5 of Table  1. From Ta-
ble 5, therefore, the effect of raising water
price is  to contract  both the  absolute  and
relative  income  distributions  among  all
farms below  a certain  size where  the risks
of  specialization  are  so  large  that  com-
plete  irrigation  is  not  undertaken  even  if
credit  is sufficient  (Table  1,  Cases  la and
lb). If irrigation offers sufficiently  low risk
relative  to nonirrigation, there  may be no
farms  larger  than  this  critical  size.  Oth-
erwise,  relative  income  distribution
spreads  among  these  larger  farms  while
the effect on absolute income  distribution
is unclear (Table  1,  Case  If). Thus, in the
former case,  conserving water by increas-
ing water price  has not only the usual de-
sired  intersectoral  efficiency  effect  but,
also,  a desirable  equity  effect  among  ag-
ricultural  producers.  In  the  latter  case,
however,  the  equity  effect  is  seemingly
undesirable-contracting  the income  dis-
tribution  among  small  producers  while
spreading  it among large  producers.
interpreting  Tables  1 and  5 are  as  follows:  p  >  pi
implies oa < 02;  P > P2 implies  -2  > o-1;  o- <  a2 implies
P  <  P2;  'T2 <  o1 implies  p  <  p 1;  m2;  >  ml  and dL~/
dL  >  1  imply  no  farms  can  be  risk  diversifiers;
m2 <  ml  and  dLd/dL  <  0  imply  no  investment;
k = 0 and a < w imply no farms can be constrained
by credit.
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TABLE 5. The  Marginal  Effects of Resource  Policies on Income  Distribution.
Special-  Credit  Risk
ized  Con-  Special-  Diversi-  n  o
Policy  Non-  strained  ized  fying
Question/  inves-  Inves-  Inves-  Inves-  Abso-  Rela-
Case  tors  tors  tors  tors  Special  Conditions  lute  tive
1 (m 21):  a  X  Xb  Xb  C
b  X  Xb  Xb  Xb  m 2 < ml  or a 1 >  2 C
c  X  Xb  X  C  C
d  X  Xb  X  Xb  m 2 < m,  C  C
e  X  Xb  m 2 > m1, 77  = O,  p > p,  S  S
f  X  X  Xb  m 2 > m 1 S
2 (mll,  m21):  a  X  X  C
b  X  X  X  a<w  C
c  X  X  X  m 2 > m 1 or  r2 > ° 1 C
d  X  X  X  X  a< w, m2 >m  or  C
a  <  w, (2 > a1
e  x  X  X b m 2 >  m  C  C
f  X  a  w  S  S
g  X  m1>  m2, 7 = O,  p >p 2 S  S
h  X  X  a  >  w, m 1 >  m 2,  S  S
n7  =  0, P >  P2
i  X  X  X  S
j  X  Xb  X  Xb  m2 <  m,  S
a C = contracts and  S =  spreads.
bAt least one farm  must be  in one of these  regimes.
Considering the case of Policy Question
2,  the assumptions  for  Policy  Question  1
again seem to be appropriate; that is, con-
version  from  flood irrigation  to  sprinkler
or drip involves  fixed  costs  of learning as
well as investments in pressure  pumps and
pipes or  tubes.  Because  of this  fixed  cost,
it seems reasonable that small farms could
not  find  sufficient  credit  while  observed
behavior  suggests that some  (larger) farms
find  sufficient  credit  for  specialized  in-
vestment.  Thus,  again, m2 >  ml and  a  >
w. These assumptions imply that farms are
distributed  among behavioral regimes  ac-
cording  to  Case  5  of Table  1. Using  this
information  in Table  5 implies  (by Cases
2c  and  2d)  that  raising  water  price  con-
tracts  both  the  absolute  and  relative  in-
come distributions  if credit  is  sufficiently
abundant so that no farm size sufficient to
spread  fixed  costs  would  find credit  con-
straining  (this assures  that the  noninvest-
ing,  specialized  investing,  and  risk-diver-
sifying  regimes  cover  all  farm  sizes).  On
the  other  hand,  if  some  investing  farms
are limited by credit, the relative  income
distribution  spreads  among  those  farms
(Table 5, Case 2i) while both the absolute
and  relative  distributions  spread  if credit
is high, a >  w, but still constraining (Case
2h).  In  this  case,  the  overall  absolute  in-
come distribution will  spread if risk  is too
low  to  cause  diversification  at  any  farm
size.  Otherwise,  because  the  credit-con-
strained group in this case represents mid-
sized farms,  the overall  effect  on income
distribution  follows  an  "S"  shaped  rela-
tionship  spreading  income  distribution
among smaller  farms  and contracting  in-
come distribution  among larger  farms.
Long-Term  Effects  of Water
Resource  Policies  on
Intrasectoral Equity
Because  resource  policies  can  have  se-
rious short-run equity effects, they can also
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have important implications for long-term
equity  effects  through  the  differential
ability  they give farmers  to expand.  That
is,  if  a  policy  makes  small  farmers  rela-
tively  better  off  than  large  farmers,  the
former may  be able  to compete  more ef-
fectively  in the land  market for purposes
of expansion  and  vice  versa.  This section
considers heuristically  the effects that dif-
ferent water resource  policies can have on
the farm  size  distribution  and the  result-
ing implications  for future water resource
policy  considerations.
Consider, first,  the case of raising effec-
tive  water  price  in  a  partially  irrigated
region. Following the previous section, in-
come  distribution  most  likely  contracts
among the three behavioral  regimes with
smaller  farm  size.  If  these  three  regimes
account  for the  entire farm  size  distribu-
tion, smaller farms will be able to compete
better with large farms for expansion land;
the long-term  effect will be to concentrate
farm  size  and  resulting  income  distribu-
tion compared  to the case with no change
in  water  pricing.  As  small  farms  become
relatively  larger  in  this  case,  the  policy
can  also  have  the  effect  of  making  irri-
gation  attractive  to  some  farms  that  are
otherwise noninvestors because larger farm
sizes  allow  fixed  costs  to  be  spread  ade-
quately;  if  this  effect  is  large  relative  to
the water  price increase, the policy  could
lead to more  irrigation  investment  or,  at
least,  make  future  water  conservation
more  expensive  from  a  policy  point  of
view.
Alternatively,  if many farms  are in the
larger risk-diversifying  regime, the spread
in  income  distribution  among  large  farm
sizes  may  lead  to  a  more  skewed  long-
term  farm  size  and  income  distribution.
While  this  effect  on  equity  may  be  un-
desirable,  it  may  concentrate  more  land
among farms  that use a lower proportion
of  their  productive  resources  under  irri-
gation  (e.g., L2/L  declines  with farm  size
in the risk-diversifying  regime  while it  is
constant  among  specialized  investors).
Thus, the future policy  cost of conserving
water may be  less in  this case.
Consider next the effect of raising water
price  in  an  irrigated  region  with  new
water-conserving  technology:  Consider,
first,  the  abundant  credit  case  where  the
short-term  effect  is  to  contract  both  the
absolute and relative income distributions.
In  this case,  smaller  noninvestors  will  be
able to compete better for expansion,  thus
making  investment  in  the  water-saving
technology  more attractive.  On the  other
hand, large risk diversifiers will be less able
to  compete  for  expansion  land  in  a rela-
tive sense. Therefore, the long-term farm-
size distribution could tend to concentrate
in the specialized investor regime not only
attaining intrasectoral equity but, also, the
highest possible industry use of water-con-
serving  technology.
Alternatively,  suppose  that  credit  con-
strains  many  farms  from  using  as  much
water-conserving  technology  as  they  de-
sire. The short-term spread in income dis-
tribution  among  these  farms  can  cause  a
long-term  spread  in the  farm  size  distri-
bution.  Depending on how farms  are ini-
tially  distributed  among  the  behavioral
regimes, this could cause more land to be-
come  concentrated  among  noninvestors
than otherwise  (e.g.,  if all  land were held
initially  by  farmers  in  the  noninvesting
and  credit-constrained  regimes),  or  land
could  become  more  concentrated  among
specialized investors  (e.g., if all land were
held initially by farmers in the credit-con-
strained  or  specialized  investor  regimes).
Comparing  the  former  case  to the abun-
dant-credit  result  suggests  that  offering
government  credit  funding  for  invest-
ment in water-conserving  technology may
greatly  improve  the  long-term  effects  of
water-conservation  policy.
Conclusions
This  paper  analyzes  the  intrasectoral
equity  effects  of  water  resource  policies
related to agriculture.  The  results are de-
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rived in a framework  exhibiting  well-rec-
ognized  features  of the agricultural  econ-
omy  associated  with  credit  market
imperfections,  risk aversion,  availability  of
alternative technologies, various stochastic
dependencies among alternative crops and
technologies,  and heterogeneity of farmers
and  farm  size.  A  wide  variety  of  results
are obtained  that may  be appropriate  for
particular  circumstances  in  specific  re-
gions.  With  respect  to  each  policy,  these
circumstances  may  differ  sufficiently  so
that the same  policy  may  cause  both the
absolute and relative  income distributions
to spread in one set of circumstances  while
contracting  in  another.  Nevertheless,  the
most likely equity effects  of water-pricing
policies aimed  toward  resource  conserva-
tion appear, for the most part, to promote
equity.  Exceptions  with  respect  to water
policy  occur  only  among  large  farms  in
partially  irrigated regions or among  mid-
sized,  credit-constrained  farms  in  regions
switching  irrigated  lands to  water-saving
technologies.
These  results  lead  to  important  long-
term  considerations.  In  the  case  of  en-
couraging investment in water-conserving
technology  in  an  irrigated  region,  these
secondary  effects are likely to be very de-
sirable in promoting both equity and con-
servation-particularly  when used in con-
junction with credit policy.  In the case of
water-conservation  policy  in partially  ir-
rigated areas, the long-term  equity effects
are probably desirable; but the cost of fu-
ture resource  conservation  becomes  more
expensive  from  a policy  perspective.
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